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Abstract 
 
In the midst of Pyongyang’s dangerous nuclear gamble, many predict a North Korean contingency and 
warn proliferation of weapons and military personnel. For this reason, government, military, and think tank 
researches recommended military intervention to address the proliferation issue. In this regard, they already 
covered proliferation sources (WHERE), missions (WHAT), assigned units (WHO), imperative for multilateral 
coordination (HOW), and force requirements (HOW MANY) of military intervention. 
 
However, proliferation partners (WHERE TO) of the loose North Korean weapons and military 
personnel are yet to be thoroughly covered. In light of this, this study analyzes the North Korean proliferation 
partners for the last 50 years to estimate potential buyers of loose North Korean weapons and military personnel 
in case of the contingency. 
 
Based on analysis of North Korean weapons export data and proliferation timeline, this research has 
found out the most likely buyers of North Korean weapons and military personnel: Iran and Syria. This research 
has also discovered North Korea’s closest and oldest partners: Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. Each of these countries 
has unique roles besides being North Korea’s ‘WMD cousins’ and their roles provide implications to North 
Korean contingency. Pakistan, North Korea’s ‘nuclear mentor’ is likely to be a ‘logistics node’ for Iran when 
another transport route is unavailable. Iran, North Korea’s ‘proliferation intermediary’ in the Middle East, may 
be the most likely proliferation partner in case of the contingency. Syria, a ‘testing ground’ for North Korean 
military minds and preview of a North Korean civil war, is another most likely proliferation partner of loose 
North Korean weapons and military personnel in the contingency.  
 
Adding value to the previous studies, the research findings from analyzing the North Korean 
proliferation suggested most likely proliferation partners (WHERE TO) and implications to the North Korean 
contingency. This research is dedicated to not only the Republic of Korea but also all states concerned with 
proliferation of weapons and military personnel. It will add value to the existing research on the North Korean 
contingency by looking at the proliferation issue from another angle. In addition, highlighting North Korea’s 
proliferation partners will be helpful in understanding the global weapon proliferation network.  
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1. Introduction 
North Korea is often considered a ‘Failed State’ for its political repression, economic misery, human rights 
abuse, international isolation and tension with its neighbors, More recently, Trump Administration stated, “all 
options are on the table” 1 (Washington Post 2017)  signaling that it may take a military measure as Pyongyang 
insists on its nuclear ambition. The international community has been stressing that only way for North Korea to 
survive is to open and reform its economy as China under Deng Xiaoping did, and cease its nuclear program. 
However, North Korea keeps refusing to take the recommended path of the international community but heads 
toward the opposite direction: a Militaristic Nuclear State. 
 
For this reason, many predict the demise of the Kim regime. It is estimated that one of the most likely 
and dangerous consequences of the North Korean contingency is proliferation of weapons and military 
personnel. In light of this, many previous studies suggested military intervention to address the proliferation 
issue. Based on multiple forms (human, image, signal, and electronic) of intelligence collected in North Korea, 
government, military, and think tank researches already covered  proliferation sources (WHERE), missions 
(WHAT), assigned units (WHO), imperative for multilateral coordination (HOW), and force requirements 
(HOW MANY) of military intervention.  
 
However, previous studies have not adequately covered proliferation partners (WHERE TO). For this 
reason, this study analyzes the history of North Korean proliferation for the last 50 years to estimate potential 
buyers of loose North Korean weapons and military personnel in case of the contingency. This research aims at 
deriving lessons from the existing North Korean proliferation partners and provides policy recommendations for 
the intelligence communities in all states concerned of controlling or at least mitigating proliferation of weapons 
and military personnel.  
 
This research will be valuable for three reasons. First, it highlights partners for proliferation that 
always deserved further research. 2 Second, it will be useful for multiple states that are concerned of weapon 
proliferation: the Republic of Korea, United States, China, Israel, etc. Third, considering the high intensity of 
the recent security environment on the Korean Peninsula that might spell an abrupt change to North Korea, this 
research will be of value for its timeliness.   
  																																								 																						
1 Anna Fifield, “White House warns North Korea not to test U.S. resolve, offering Syria and Afghanistan strikes as examples”, Washington Post, April 17, 2017. 
2 Korea Defense Intelligence Agency (KDIA), the chief intelligence authority in the ROK military has a large staff organization and sources for intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis 
from North Korea but still needs improvement in its overseas intelligence capability. 
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2. Literature Review 
Previous studies produced in the government, military, and think tank domains already covered possible 
scenarios, probability, estimated consequences, and recommended measures about the North Korean 
contingency. In particular, regarding the concern on proliferation of weapons and military personnel, they 
already made a remarkable contribution to solving this problem by military intervention. They already covered 
proliferation sources (WHERE), assigned units (WHO), missions (WHAT), imperative for multilateral 
coordination (HOW), and force requirements (HOW MANY) of military intervention to address the 
proliferation issue.  
 
First, previous research in the think 
tank community and military covered 
proliferation sources: production and 
storage facility for conventional and WMD 
arsenal scattered throughout North Korea. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative organized WMD 
facilities in North Korea in a map.3 (Nuclear 
Threat Initiative 2017) As displayed in 
Figure 1, locations (WHERE) of North 
Korean WMD facilities are well known. It 
means that WMD proliferation sources are 
already identified by multiple intelligence 
sources and government and military 
authorities must have corresponding 
measures and plans already.  
 
  
																																								 																						
3 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Interactive North Korea Facilities Map, http://www.nti.org/gmap/?place=39.1195,127.2055,8&layers=nuclear,missile,biological 
Figure	1.	North	Korean	WMD	facilities	map 
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Second, previous literature covered a recommended measure: military intervention. In his 38 North 
piece, Robert Peters well described missions for the intervening military forces (WHAT). “Its effort must 
include locating, seizing and securing weapons depots; rendering constituted WMD safe through dismantlement 
of the warhead or weapon delivery mechanism; maritime interdiction to prevent leakage off the peninsula;  
stopping movement of people and materials of concern along land borders; and dismantlement of possible 
proliferation networks so that materials of concern or even weapons do not move out of the theater in the midst 
of a chaotic security environment”. 4 (PetersRobert 2015)  
 
Third, based on the available North Korea intelligence, Military authorities allegedly have a combined 
plan to address WMD challenges in North Korea; Concept Plan 5029.5 (SutherlandJJ 2010) ROK military and 
US Forces in Korea have reportedly assigned special units (WHO), the CJTF-E (Combined Joint Task Force for 
Elimination) to locate, control, and disarm all WMD sites.6 (PetersRobert 2015). In addition, China also seems 
aware of possible WMD and refugee crisis. People’s Liberation Army Shenyang Military District regularly 
holds river-crossing exercises7 (Daily NK 2008), possibly in preparation of a military intervention to set up 
refugee camps within the North Korean territory and control WMD.  
 
Fourth, Bruce Bennett also stressed the importance of multilateral military coordination among 
intervening states (HOW). He wrote, “ROK and US should work closely with China, Russia, and even Japan 
should also be involved in dealing with the possible violence in North Korea because they will each have a 
stake in any regional conflict”.8 (BennettBruce 2013, 179) Bennett also notes, “While South Korean and US 
forces advance from the South to secure the means of delivery for WMD and its production facilities located in 
the Southern part of North Korea, the intervening Chinese forces would be able to reach and handle the fissile 
material in the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility.9 (BennettBruce 2013, 216)  
 
Fifth, force requirement (HOW MANY) estimate to implement WMD elimination and DDR 
(Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration) is also covered by previous literature. In Table 1, Jennifer 
Lind displayed force requirements for stability operations in North Korea in a most permissive environment, in 
which no military or paramilitary forces resist the stabilization effort. In this case, total number of troops needed 
																																								 																						
4 Peters, Robert J. “The WMD Challenges Posed by a Collapse of North Korea”. 38 North, April 14, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/04/rpeters041415/. 
5 JJ Sutherland, “U.S. Weighs Options In Possible N. Korea Conflict”, NPR, July 27, 2010.  6	Peters, Robert J. “The WMD Challenges Posed by a Collapse of North Korea”. 38 North, April 14, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/04/rpeters041415/.	
7 Daily NK, “The People's Liberation Army of China Trains in the Yalu River”, Daily NK, May 8, 2008.  
8 Bennett, “Preparing for Possibility of a North Korean Collapse”, 179. 
9 Bennett, Preparing for Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, 216. 
7	
is 263,000 at least, and troops between 52,000 and 59,000 will be required for WMD elimination and 
conventional disarmament missions that are directly relevant to proliferation. 10 (LindJennifer 2012, 5)  
Mission Requirements (number of soldiers) 
Stability operation 198,000 - 312,000 
Border control 24,000 
WMD elimination 3,000 - 10,000 
Conventional disarmament 49,000 
Combat/Deterrence 70,000-10,500 
Total 263,000 – 405,000 
Table	1.	Force	Requirements	for	Post-Collapse	Stability	Operations	in	North	Korea	
 
However, even though previous literature made great accomplishments in addressing the proliferation 
sources (WHERE), missions (WHAT), assigned units (WHO), multilateral coordination (HOW), and force 
requirements (HOW MANY) of military intervention,  previous literature has not adequately covered potential 
proliferation partners (WHERE TO). Addressing proliferation sources is important but identifying and 
analyzing the potential partners of proliferation should not be overlooked. Because, dealing with the 
proliferation sources along with proliferation partners will be much more effective.  
 
In light of this, this research highlighting the previously overlooked aspect, North Korea’s proliferation 
partners (WHERE TO), will have research value for mainly three reasons. First, it will add value to the existing 
research by looking at the proliferation issue from another angle. Second, since Pyongyang already has been 
proliferating WMD, conventional weapons, and military personnel to states and even non-state actors for 
decades, highlighting North Korea’s proliferation partners will be helpful in understanding the global weapon 
proliferation network.  
 
  
																																								 																						
10 Jennifer Lind. "Preparing for North Korean Collapse", Asan Issue Brief 17, January 31, 2012, 5. 
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3. Methodology 
As aforementioned, this study aims to highlight potential North Korean proliferation partners in case of North 
Korean contingency. Accordingly, the main question for the research is as follows.  
 
Research question: “Who would be interested in proliferated North Korean weapons and military 
personnel?” 
 
In light of this, this study analyzes the North Korean proliferation partners for the last 50 years to estimate 
potential buyers of loose North Korean weapons and military personnel in case of the contingency. It derives 
lessons from the findings of the existing North Korean proliferation partners to provide policy recommendations. 
 
This research analyzes the history of North Korea’s the proliferation between North Korea and its 
partners since 1967 when it reportedly began. Then why analyze history? North Korea’s proliferation partners 
will not likely to change significantly even in contingency. Since finding a new partner outside the existing 
network will be unlikely in the midst of the contingency in particular. Those willing and able to sell weapons 
and military personnel would look to the existing partners rather than exploring new ‘markets’. Assuming no 
significant change of Pyongyang’s proliferation partners, potential buyers of the proliferated weapons and 
military personnel in contingency will not be so different from the existing ones. For this reason, it is important 
to analyze the existing partners. Analyzing the history of Pyongyang’s proliferation can help us estimate the 
how the proliferation partners would work in the future.  
 
There are two main pillars of the history analysis. First, North Korea’s weapons export volume and 
export items will reveal Pyongyang’s most important weapons export partners and best-selling items. Second, a 
timeline, a compilation of intelligence from multiple sources, of North Korea’s proliferation activities will 
provide how North Korea has been selling its conventional weapons, military personnel, missiles, and WMD. 
By using both weapons export data and timeline, I tried not to omit crucial details by using two pillars of 
sources, but provide more accurate and comprehensive research findings. 
 
Subsequently, based on research findings from the North Korea’s proliferation network, their 
implications to North Korea will be further elaborated. Lastly, policy recommendations based on the findings 
will follow.    
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4. Caveats 
(1) Open-source information  
For use or citation of confidential sources is limited, all sources used for this research are based on open-
source information including media coverage, books, journal articles, reports, and online data. 
 
(2) Focus on North Korea’s outbound proliferation  
This research focuses on North Korea’s outbound proliferation, which means where and how Pyongyang 
proliferated its weapons and military personnel. Although former Soviet Union, Pakistan, and China have 
played a key role in the North Korean nuclear and missile program, multiple researches already covered the 
details behind how Pyongyang acquired missiles and nuclear weapons. Therefore, this research does not 
focus on how North Korea acquired its weapons and technology, but focuses on how North Korea 
proliferates them.  
 
(3) Proliferation can happen without central government control 
In fact, Libyan case well demonstrates that proliferation of weapons and military personnel occurs without 
central government control. The 2011 fall of Gadhafi regime resulted in proliferation of conventional 
weapons including Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPG), 
mines, mortars, and ammunition. Russian-made RPG-29 were smuggled out of Libya and sold to Syria, 
handed over to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and used against the Israel Defense Forces in battles. 11 (SchiffZe'ev 
2006) In addition, Gadhafi’s mercenaries heavily armed and well trained in the Libyan civil war returned to 
their homes in Mali, Chad, and Niger and became rebel militants. 12 (GlobalHelios 2013) 
 
(4) Limited information 
First pillar of the analysis on the North Korean proliferation network, the weapons export data only displays 
transfer of conventional weapons and missiles. It does not display military personnel and WMD transfer. 
Second pillar, the timeline includes compiled intelligence from multiple sources but not limited to visits and 
dispatch of key figures such as scientists and government officials, intercepts of cargos from North Korean 
ports, transport of weapons and ammunitions, sanctions imposed on key entities, and major agreements. As 
the timeline is a compilation of scattered information found in government documents, media coverage, 
academic journals, intelligence report, and claims by relevant individuals, the timeline may not include all 																																								 																						
11 Ze'ev Schiff, “Hezbollah Anti-tank Fire Causing Most IDF Casualties in Lebanon”, Haaretz, August 06, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/news/hezbollah-anti-tank-fire-causing-most-idf-
casualties-in-lebanon-1.194528. 
12 Helios Global, " Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation from Libya Threatens Stability in the Sahel and Northwest Africa”, Helios Global, August 12, 2013, 
http://www.heliosglobalinc.com/world-trends-watch/?p=232. 
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the North Korean proliferation activities. Also, the timeline includes several allegations of proliferation 
activity difficult to confirm for insufficient evidence. 
 
(5) India, Israel, and the US bias 
English-written sources by the US, Israeli, and Indian experts that accuse Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Iraq are 
widely cited for their availability. Unfortunately, Arabic and Persian sources were not available due to the 
language barrier, and English sources written by Syrian, Iranian, Pakistani experts, making the research is 
not free from India, Israel, and the US bias. 
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5. North Korea’s Proliferation Partners (1967-2016) and Implications for a North 
Korean Contingency 
As aforementioned, based on weapons export data and timeline (owing to their volume, refer to Appendix in the 
latter part of the paper), Table 2 displays the summary of the North Korean proliferation partners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of North Korean proliferation network 
 
 
Group 1 
Conventional weapons 
(C) 
Group 2 
Missile  
(M) 
Group 3 
Expertise  
(E) 
Group 4 
WMD  
(W) 
1967-
1976 
Demo. Rep. of Congo 
 Madagascar 
 
Egypt 
Syria 
 
1977-
1986 
Egypt 
Guyana 
Iran 
 Libya  
Syria 
Tanzania 
Iran 
 Libya 
Pakistan  
Syria 
Syria  
1987-
1996 
Uganda 
Iran 
Pakistan 
 Syria 
UAE 
Syria  
1997-
2006 
Ethiopia 
Hezbollah 
 Myanmar 
Vietnam 
Yemen, 
Iran 
Pakistan 
Syria  
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Hamas 
 Hezbollah 
 Iran 
 Syria 
Iran 
Pakistan 
Syria 
2007-
2016 
Hamas 
Hezbollah 
Iran 
Myanmar 
Palestine 
Republic of Congo 
Syria 
Hezbollah 
Iran 
Syria 
Hezbollah 
Syria 
Iran 
Syria 
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Horizontal rows are organized by time. North Korea’s partners placed in the upper row are considered 
to have the oldest link with Pyongyang. If a partner is no longer displayed on the lower row like Madagascar, it 
implies that its link with Pyongyang grew weak. In contrast, if it still appears in the lower row like Syria for 
instance, its link with Pyongyang remains strong. Therefore, North Korea’s most recent partners are Hamas, 
Hezbollah, Iran, Myanmar, Palestine, Republic of Congo, and Syria.  
 
Vertical columns are organized by North Korea’s relationship. As shown on the table, Pyongyang’s 
network consists of four Groups. Group 1 partners are least significant, while Group 4 partners are most 
significant for Pyongyang. In this structure, North Korea’s relationship with the Group 1 partners can be 
described as weapon customers, while the relationship with Group 4 partners such as Iran, Pakistan and Syria is 
most significant. There are several partners listed in multiple Groups like Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria, their 
Group is determined with the highest Group they belong. For instance, since Syria is listed in all four Groups, it 
is considered Group 4, the highest Group.  
 
Table 3 shows the North Korean proliferation partners by time. Those listed in the top row are least 
likely to get in touch with Pyongyang for further deals. In contrast, those listed in the bottom row have the most 
recent link with Pyongyang and likely to keep it unless a significant change in relationship takes place.  
 
Among the partners shown in the Table 3, most frequently listed partners, which means North Korea’s 
oldest partners are marked bold: Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. They kept close ties with North Korea for at least 
three decades.  
  
1967-1976 Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Madagascar, Syria 
1977-1986 Egypt, Guyana, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Tanzania 
1987-1996 Iran, Pakistan, UAE, Uganda, Syria 
1997-2006 Ethiopia, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen 
2007-2016 Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Myanmar, Palestine, Republic of Congo, Syria 
Table 3: North Korea's proliferation partners (by time) 
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Table 4 displays the four groups of North Korean overseas partners based on relationship. Analysis on 
each four groups and their implications in case of North Korean contingency will follow. Partners that recently 
had interacted with North Korea are marked bold. 
Group 1 
Weapons customers 
(17) 
Group 2 
Missile clients  
(8) 
Group 3 
Expertise partners (5) 
Group 4 
WMD cousins  
(3) 
- DR of Congo 
- Egypt  
- Ethiopia 
- Guyana  
- Hamas 
- Hezbollah 
- Iran 
- Libya  
- Madagascar 
- Myanmar 
- Palestine 
- Rep. of Congo 
- Syria  
- Tanzania 
- Uganda 
- Vietnam 
- Yemen 
- Hezbollah 
- Iran 
- Libya 
- Pakistan 
- Syria 
- UAE 
- Vietnam 
- Yemen 
- Egypt 
- Hamas 
- Hezbollah 
- Iran 
- Syria 
- Iran 
- Pakistan 
- Syria 
Table 4: North Korea’s proliferation partners (by relationship) 
 
(1) Group 1: Weapon customers 
Those placed in the Group 1 column are called ‘Weapon Customers’. Group 1 includes Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guyana, Madagascar, Myanmar, Republic of Congo, Palestine, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Vietnam. They are considered the lowest Group considering their investment value.  
 
Selling conventional weapons is considered short-term relationship. Because it does not involve 
long-term commitment compared with transfer of missile, expertise, and WMD. Despite a few exceptions, 
when Pyongyang finds a potential for further investment from a Group 1 partner, its relation upgrades to a 
higher group.  
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North Korean conventional weapons will likely proliferate to the Group 1 partners in case of the 
contingency. Group 1 partners will likely be interested in buying the North Korean conventional weapons 
as they already did. In the same way, any North Korean in charge of storage and maintenance of the 
conventional weapons are likely to get in touch with the ‘weapon customers’ on their sales record by any 
means with or without centralized control of the Kim regime. In particular, North Korean conventional 
weapons are likely to fall in the hands of the most recent partners including Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, 
Myanmar, Palestine, Republic of Congo, and Syria. 
 
(2) Group 2: Missile clients 
Group 2 partners are ‘Missile clients’ that buy North Korean missiles and pay North Korean missile 
technicians for providing technological maintenance. Hezbollah, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, UAE, 
Vietnam, and Yemen fall into this Group. Group 2 includes several partners that have only short-term 
relationship with North Korea such as UAE and Vietnam. 
 
Missile clients (Group 2) are considered higher than Group 1 because of high investment value of 
missiles technology. Compared to conventional weapon technology, it takes much more time - years or 
even decades - for investment to develop and produce missile components, namely boosters, engines, 
guidance system, launchers, re-entry vehicles, fuse, warheads, etc. In addition, growing technicians with 
knowledge of basic science (physics and chemistry), and applied science (ballistics, aerodynamics, space 
engineering, etc.) takes decades as well. 
 
In addition, what differentiates a missile from conventional weapons is its strategic value. Since 
missiles can fly hundreds of kilometers at least and destroy or attrit enemy assets without loss of friendly 
assets, they are regarded as strategic assets. Moreover, strategic value of a missile is maximized when a 
missile carries a WMD-loaded warhead. It becomes a means of delivery for WMD, making it incomparably 
more lethal than conventional warheads. The more lethal it is, the more expensive it becomes. For this 
reason, North Korea has been actively selling missiles to its missile clients (Group 2) that paid for 
expensive high-end weapons.  
 
Group 2 missile clients are likely buyers of the loose North Korean missiles in case of the 
contingency. In particular, among the missile clients including Hezbollah, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, 
UAE, Vietnam, and Yemen, most recent missile clients Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria are most likely to 
attempt to acquire the loose North Korean missiles.  
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(3) Group3: Expertise partners 
Group 3 partners including Egypt, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria are so-called ‘Expertise partners’. 
These ‘partners’ learn from their North Korean ‘mentors’: military instructors, underground facility 
engineers, operation planners, and pilots (high-value military personnel) for example. In return, North 
Korean military personnel teaching in the partner countries can acquire real combat experience, which is 
unavailable in North Korea. 
 
Group 3 is considered closer to North Korea than the Group 2 as it involves long-term relationship. 
It takes years of investment to develop military education and training programs and grow human resources 
with expertise in operating fighter jets, constructing underground facilities, and devising operation plans. 
The hard-earned North Korean military expertise proliferates to the Group 2 partners in the name of 
military cooperation. Group 3 partners have long-standing relationship with Pyongyang for more than 10 
years, making them eligible for higher group than the Group 2 except Hamas with short history that began 
in 1987.13 (LaubZachary 2014) 
 
In the contingency, it implies that North Korean military personnel with expertise will likely be 
proliferate to the Group 3 partners to seek ‘job opportunities’ and asylum out of the turmoil in their home 
country. In addition, it will be more challenging to do so in the midst of the turmoil following the 
contingency. In light of this, North Korean military personnel with expertise will likely look to the most 
recent partners that have used their expertise: Hezbollah and Syria.   
 
(4) Group 4: WMD cousins 
Iran, Pakistan, and Syria are North Korea’s ‘WMD cousins’, with the closest relationship among the 
proliferation partners. At the same time, they are the oldest partners that have kept close ties with North 
Korea for at least three decades. 
 
Iran has been seeking North Korean assistance in their nuclear programs until the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 14 (US State Department 2015) when it agreed to use its nuclear 
program for exclusively peaceful purposes. Pakistan bartered its nuclear technology with North Korean 
																																								 																						
13 Zachary Laub, “Hamas”, Council on Foreign Relations, August 1, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hamas  
14 US State Department, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, US State Department, June 14, 2015, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ 
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missile technology in the late 1990s15 (Council on Foreign Relations 2005), making it difficult to monitor 
by export and import records. This is the reason why the North Korean export data displays only one 
transaction with Pakistan. Syria, as accused by many experts in the previous studies, has been the most 
loyal user of not only North Korean nuclear technology but also chemical weapons, conventional weapons, 
missiles, underground construction technology, and military expertise.  
 
In case of contingency, North Korean WMD is likely to proliferate to Pyongyang’s WMD cousins: 
Iran and Syria. Given the long-term ‘WMD relationship’ with North Korea, their WMD experts must have 
established a good range of human network each other. Assuming their WMD relationship stays the same, 
North Korean WMD experts will likely seek asylum with key material. In this case, most likely partners for 
the North Korean WMD are Iran and Syria, Pyongyang’s most recent WMD partners. A reason behind the 
Pakistani exclusion from the this list will be further explained the latter part. 
 
(5) Closest and oldest partners: Pakistan, Iran, and Syria 
Among the proliferation partners, there are three most significant ones: Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. They are 
significant not only because of their close and long-term relationship with Pyongyang but also for their 
roles in the indirect proliferation in the region. Their roles are analyzed to understand how the proliferation 
partners work together.  
 
Pakistan 
First among North Korea’s three WMD cousins, Pakistan has three main roles: a ‘logistics node’ for Iran 
when necessary, ‘nuclear mentor’, and missile client.  
 
First, Pakistan’s role began in the 1980s when Pakistan provided a ground transport route of North 
Korean conventional weapons and missiles bound for Iran via Pakistan. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran 
could successfully acquire North Korean conventional weapons and missiles thanks to the Pakistani help. 
 
Second, Pakistan played a role of ‘nuclear mentor’ to North Korea with the Chinese nuclear 
technology after signing of a secret Sino-Pakistani nuclear technology cooperation agreement in 1976.16 
(WeinerTim 1998)  In an effort to have someone to maintain balance of power behind India, China 																																								 																						
15 Council on Foreign Relations, “PAKISTAN: The North Korea Connection”, Council on Foreign Relations, February 7, 2005, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/pakistan-north-korea-
connection 
16 Tim Weiner, “U.S. And China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb”, The New York Times on the web, June 1, 1998, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/060198pakistan-nuke-
history.html 
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provided Pakistan with active nuclear technological assistance. The plutonium production reactor and 
reprocessing facility in Pakistan were reportedly built by Chinese assistance. 17 (GertzBill 1996) China also 
provided Pakistan with missiles including M-9, M-11 and a number of Dong Feng-21 (renamed Hatf, 
Shaheen I & Shaheen II respectively) ballistic missiles.18 (MalikMohan 2003, 62) In the 1990s, North 
Korea and Pakistan found a mutually beneficial deal: nuclear and missile barter. The Father of Pakistani 
nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan (a.k.a. AQ Khan) visited North Korea multiple times in the 1990s for 
nuclear technology transfer.  
 
Third, Pakistan used to be a major missile client for North Korea until 2007 when its missile 
program reached maturity that ensures sufficient range and payload to strike strategic partners in India. 19 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016) As the timeline provides, North Korea has actively sent missile scientists 
to Pakistan along with sales of missile components until Pakistan no longer needs to extend its missile 
range. 
 
Pakistan’s three roles provide two implications for North Korea. First, Pakistan can still provide a 
key transport route of North Korean conventional weapons, military personnel, missiles, and even WMD to 
Iran if direct routes to Iran are unavailable. Second, despite the most recent confirmed evidences of nuclear 
proliferation between Islamabad and Pyongyang, Pakistan may be still providing nuclear assistance to 
North Korea until Pyongyang’s nuclear program reaches maturity. Third, North Korean missiles and WMD 
are unlikely to proliferate to Pakistan since it already accomplished nuclear deterrence with missiles 
ranging India. 
 
Iran 
Among the North Korean proliferation partners, only Iran and Syria are listed in all four groups, which rely 
on North Korean conventional weapons, military expertise, missiles, and WMD. Beside Iran’s prominent 
presence among the proliferation partners, Iran also plays a unique role in the network: a ‘proliferation 
intermediary’.  
 
Iran serves as an intermediary of North Korean conventional weapons and military expertise in the 
Middle East. Iran’s elite conservative forces, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has a special 
operations unit called the Qods Forces (QF). It assumes a foreign policy role in the IRGC to exert Iran’s 																																								 																						
17 Bill Gertz, “China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant”, Washington Times, April 3, 1996.  
18 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 62. 
19 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Missile”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2016, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/delivery-systems/ 
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influence throughout the region by supporting pro-Iranian forces in clandestine ways.20 (IssacharoffAvi 
2014) The QF serves as a link that connects Iran with Syria, and even non-state actors like Hezbollah and 
Hamas by providing them with military expertise and weapons.  
 
IRGC leaders have confirmed the QF is in Syria to assist the Assad regime against an armed 
uprising, and it is advising the Iraqi government against the ISIS.21 (KatzmanKenneth 2016) An Iranian 
port at Bandar Abbas, located at the Strait of Hormuz serves as a key node for transporting goods to Iran’s 
protégés including Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Andrea Berger, a renowned expert on North Korean 
WMD proliferation wrote, “There is little reason to doubt that this proliferation network will persist”.22 
(BergerAndrea 2014) 
 
Iran’s role in the North Korean proliferation network implies several points. First, Iran will be the 
most likely partner for loose North Korean conventional weapons, military personnel with expertise, 
missiles, and WMD. Unlike Pakistan who accomplished strategic deterrence against India based on 
maturity in its missile and nuclear programs, Iranian leaders, IRGC in particular, may be still eager to 
follow the path of Pakistan. Naturally, North Korean missile and nuclear expertise are desperately needed 
in this sense. Second, Iran, using the Qods Force in particular, is likely to play the intermediary role in the 
Middle East by relaying the loose North Korean weapons and military personnel as it has.  
 
Syria 
Since Syria has been the most loyal client of all kinds of North Korean military weapons and expertise 
ranging from conventional weapons to WMD, it has multiple roles in the network: a loyal client, ‘testing 
ground’ for North Korean military minds, and a ‘patron’ for non-state actors.  
 
First, Syria has been the most loyal partner to North Korea. In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea’s 
primary export item for Syria was military personnel with expertise: instructors, pilots, tank crew, etc. 
Subsequently, Damascus and Pyongyang enhanced their area of cooperation to conventional weapons, 
missiles, and finally WMD.  
 
Second, Syria is a testing ground for North Korean military minds. By engaging in Syrian conflicts, 
North Korean military minds can acquire field experience and lessons unavailable in North Korea, where a 																																								 																						
20 Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas, Hezbollah, Revolutionary Guards said to meet in Beirut”, Times of Israel, July 4, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-hezbollah-irgc-said-to-meet-in-beirut/ 
21 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy,” 7-5700 (Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2016), 30. 
22 Andrea Berger, “North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?”, 38 North, August 05, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/ 
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real combat does not take place. Like the Republic of Korea military that acquires real field experience by 
dispatching its troops for peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, South Sudan, and so on, 
North Korea also learns from real field experience from the Syrian battlefield.  
 
Third, similar to Iran, the intermediary of proliferation, Syria also plays a ‘patron’ role for non-
state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas with conventional weapons and military expertise from North 
Korea. Thanks to the Syrian patronage, Hamas and Hezbollah have been beneficiaries of the North Korean 
military accomplishments during the last two decades, and enhanced their capability against primary 
adversary: the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).  
 
The mastermind behind all these was Kim Kyok Sik, the Minister of People’s Armed Forces and a 
key link between Pyongyang and Damascus visited Syria. In 1970s, he served as the deputy military attaché 
in the North Korean embassy in Damascus. The projects he managed included helping to rehabilitate the 
Syrian armed forces in the 1970’s, coordinating shipments of MRL systems23—including the now infamous 
122mm MRL systems used to deliver chemical rounds against the Syrian civilians in the recent civil war. 
He also managed projects aimed at providing training and military support to non-state actors including 
Hezbollah through Syria until his death in 2015. 24  (BechtolBruce 2015) 
 
Syria’s roles have several implications for a North Korean contingency. First, along with Iran, 
Syria will be the most likely buyer of loose North Korean conventional weapons, military personnel, 
missiles, and WMD for the same reasons aforementioned. Second, in case a civil war breaks out in North 
Korea, it may resemble the ongoing Syrian civil war, which is a testing ground for the North Korean 
military. Because both North Korean conventional and unconventional weapons are in use during the 
Syrian conflict beside the North Korean military expertise such as operation planning, combat tactics, and 
underground facility construction techniques, a North Korean civil war may look like a déjà vu of the 
Syrian civil war.  
 
Based on the research findings, Figure 2 summarizes how North Korean proliferation network 
functions. 
 
																																								 																						
23 MRL: Multiple Rocket Launch 
24 Bruce Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: Partners in Destruction and Violence”, 280. 
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Figure 2. North Korea's proliferation network 
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6. Conclusion 
North Korea, the failed state and proliferation source of conventional weapons, military expertise, missiles, and 
WMD, will face its demise anyhow and anytime. For this reason, previous literature by government, military, 
and think tank community covered proliferation sources (WHERE), missions (WHAT), assigned units (WHO), 
imperative for multilateral coordination (HOW), and force requirements (HOW MANY) of military 
intervention to address the proliferation issue.  
 
However, proliferation partners (WHERE TO) were yet to be thoroughly covered. In light of this, this 
research highlighted the potential proliferation partner by analyzing the history of North Korean proliferation 
since its beginning in 1967. Based on analysis of North Korean weapons export data and proliferation timeline, 
this research revealed the most likely buyers of North Korean weapons and military personnel. Hamas, 
Hezbollah, Iran, Myanmar, Palestine, Republic of Congo, and Syria are most likely buyers for conventional 
weapons, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria for missiles, Hezbollah and Syria for military expertise, and Iran and Syria 
for WMD. Most likely buyers of all of the four are Iran and Syria. 
 
In addition, this research discovered North Korea’s closest and oldest partners in its proliferation 
network: Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. Each of these WMD cousins has unique roles that provide implications to 
North Korean contingency. Pakistan, North Korea’s ‘nuclear mentor’ is likely to be a ‘logistics node’ for Iran 
when other transport is unavailable. Iran, North Korea’s ‘proliferation intermediary’ in the Middle East, may be 
the most likely proliferation partner in case of the contingency. Syria, a ‘testing ground’ for North Korean 
military minds and preview of a possible North Korean civil war, is another most likely proliferation partner of 
loose North Korean weapons and military personnel in the contingency.  
 
By looking at the proliferation issue from another angle (WHERE TO), this research analyzed North 
Korea’s proliferation partners. Furthermore, this research shed light to a part of the global weapon proliferation 
network by analyzing North Korea’s proliferation partners and how they work with each other. Accordingly, 
not only the Republic of Korea but also all states concerned with proliferation of weapons and military 
personnel must take actions in a timely manner.  
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7. Recommendations 
This part provides several policy recommendations based on the research findings and implications. The 
recommended Course of Actions (COA) are mainly for the Republic of Korea but also applied to any country 
concerned of North Korean proliferation of weapons and military personnel.  
 
COA #1: If available, take DIE (Diplomatic, Intelligence, and Economic) measures directly with most 
likely buyers of the North Korean weapons and military personnel: Republic of Congo, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, 
Myanmar, Palestine, and Syria.  
 
Since North Korea’s most recent proliferations headed to the partners above, taking appropriate DIE 
measures would be important in tracking and controlling the proliferation activity in case of the North Korean 
contingency. In this case, the measures include official and unofficial diplomatic deals, overt and covert 
intelligence deals, and providing economic incentives for potential intermediaries and end-users of the 
proliferated North Korean weapons and military personnel in exchange of information.  
 
COA #2: Along with COA #1, enhance DIE measures with neighboring countries or Inter-
Governmental Organizations of the partners above. 
 
Since Hamas and Hezbollah are not state actors with diplomatic authority, and some states like Syria 
may have better diplomatic relationship with North Korea than the ROK, diplomatic effort may not be a viable 
option. In this case, covert diplomatic negotiations with the UN to assign the ROK Battalion or ‘Dongmyong 
Unit’ dispatched in Lebanon for a peacekeeping mission may be a viable option. In addition, intelligence 
cooperation with the Israel, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia will also be an alternative. 
 
COA#3: Enhance cooperation with port and airport authorities of all countries geographically located 
between North Korea and the likely partners.  
 
Since there are records of intercepts and seizure of North Korean cargo that contained conventional 
weapons, missiles, and their components, enhancing cooperation with port and airport authorities will be helpful 
in tracking and intercepting the proliferation attempts.  
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8. Appendix 
(1) Key Terms 
 
- Contingency: It refers to all possible events that may bring a major instability to the North Korean regime’s 
control on its weapons and military personnel. It includes a coup, revolution, civil war, invasion, natural 
disaster, etc. 
 
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): According to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), WMD 
is defined “Any weapons that is designed or intend to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, 
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors” 25 (FBI 2016). In this paper, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction refers to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons designed to 
kill mass people. Missile, often considered WMD by some, is NOT considered WMD, as it is a means of 
delivery for both WMD and conventional warheads. 
 
- Conventional weapons: All types of weapons except WMD are categorized as conventional weapons. In 
this research, North Korea’s main export items such as anti-tank missiles, self-propelled rocket launchers, 
rifles, and artilleries are conventional weapons.  
 
- Military personnel: Single or multiple personnel with adequate military education and training are 
considered military personnel. In particular, technicians and scientists with military technology are also 
military personnel considering the danger they might pose on or against their willingness. 
 
- Proliferation: In this paper, proliferation refers to temporary or permanent change of ownership of the 
weapon(s) or chain of command for military personnel. It includes tangible assets such as missiles, weapons, 
parts, and fissile material. In addition, it also included intangible assets including underground construction, 
missile, and nuclear technology, military expertise including education and training, and mercenary contract 
as well. In this context, proliferation may take place inside and outside the North Korean territory. However, 
this research primarily focuses on proliferation outside the North Korean territory. 
 
- Partners: Partners in this paper mean both state and non-state actors that have engaged in any type of 
proliferation activities regardless of their frequency.   
  																																								 																						
25 FBI, “What are Weapons of Mass Destruction?”, FBI, January 7, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs. 
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(2) North Korea’s Weapons Export Volume 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides data on North Korean weapons export 
volume. The earliest record available is export to Democratic Republic of Congo in 1974. 
 
North Korean weapons export volume (1967-2016)   
DR Congo (1974-1975) $17M 
Egypt (1984-1987) $65M 
Ethiopia (2000) $3 M 
Guyana (1980) $5 M 
Iran (1982-2004) $1527 M 
Libya (1980, 1999) $13 M 
Madagascar (1975-1979) $26 M 
Myanmar (1999) $11 M 
Pakistan (1996-1997) $8 M 
Syria (1981-2009) $515 M 
Tanzania (1980) $20 M 
UAE (1989) $44 M 
Uganda (1987) $9 M 
Viet Nam (1996-1998) $51 M 
Yemen (2001-2002) $79 M 
    
Total $2393 M 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database   
Table 2: North Korean weapons export volume 
 
Table 5 displays that Iran and Syria are among the largest importers of North Korean weapons.  
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(3) North Korea’s Weapons Export Items 
In addition to Table 5, Chart 1 provides a more detailed North Korean weapons exports. Weapons marked 
red are Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM) that are not considered conventional weapons.  
  
      Year(s)   
Recipient/  No. Weapon Weapon Year of  
 supplier (S) ordered designation description of order delivery delivered  
  
  
DR Congo 
S: North Korea 3 Project-123/P-4 Fast attack craft  (1973) 1974 3  
       (10) M-46 130mm Towed gun (1975) 1975 (10)  
  
Egypt 
S: North Korea (145) BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1983) 1984-1987 (145)  
  
Ethiopia 
S: North Korea (10) YW-531/Type-63 APC (2000) 2000 (10)  
  
Guyana 
S: North Korea 12 D-30 122mm Towed gun (1979) 1980 12  
       6 Type-63 107mm Towed MRL (1982) 1983 (6)  
  
Iran 
S: North Korea (100) BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1982) 1982-1987 (100)  
       (100) M-1985 240mm Self-propelled MRL (1987) 1988-1998 (100)  
       (170) Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C SSM 1990 1991-1993 (170)  
       (150) T-62 Tank (1981) 1982-1983 (150)  
       (6) MiG-19 Fighter aircraft (1982) 1983 6  
       (200) Type-63 107mm Towed MRL (1982) 1982-1986 (200)  
       (480) Type-59-1 130mm Towed gun (1983) 1983-1988 (480)  
       (4000) 9M14M/AT-3 Anti-tank missile 1986 1986-1989 (4000)  
       3 Chaho Patrol craft (1986) 1987 3  
       (20) HY-2/SY-1A/CSS-N-2 Anti-ship missile (1986) 1987-1988 (20)  
       (20) M-1978 170mm Self-propelled gun 1986 1987-1988 (20)  
       (100) R-17 Elbrus/Scud-B SSM 1987 1987-1988 (100)  
       (10) 9P117/Scud-B TEL Mobile SSM launcher (1993) 1993-1995 (10)  
       (15) Peykaap FAC (2001) 2002-2003 (15)  
       (3) Gahjae FAC (2002) 2002 3  
       (3) Kajami FAC (2002) 2002-2003 (3)  
       (10) Tir FAC 2002 2002-2004 (10)  
  
Libya 
S: North Korea (10) BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1979) 1980 (10)  
       (5) Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C SSM 1995 1999 (5)  
  
Madagascar 
S: North Korea 4 MiG-17 Fighter aircraft (1975) 1975 4  
       4 Nampo Landing craft (1978) 1979 (4)  
  
Myanmar 
S: North Korea (16) Type-59-1 130mm Towed gun (1998) 1999 (16)  
  
Pakistan 
S: North Korea (2) Nodong SSM (1993) 1996-1997 (2)  
 
 
Syria 
S: North Korea (100) Scud Mod-D SSM (1996) 2000-2009 (100)  
       (50) BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1981) 1981-1984 (50)  
       (10) Type-63 107mm Towed MRL (1981) 1982 (10)  
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       (12) 9P117/Scud-B TEL Mobile SSM launcher 1990 1991-1993 (12)  
       (160) Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C SSM 1990 1991-2000 (160)  
  
Tanzania 
S: North Korea 4 Nampo Landing craft (1979) 1980 (4)  
  
UAE 
S: North Korea (6) 9P117/Scud-B TEL Mobile SSM launcher (1989) 1989 (6)  
       (25) R-17 Elbrus/Scud-B SSM (1989) 1989 (25)  
  
Uganda 
S: North Korea 10 BM-21 Grad 122mm Self-propelled MRL (1987) 1987 10  
       (14) BTR-152 APC (1987) 1987 (14)  
       (100) Strela-2/SA-7 Portable SAM (1987) 1987 (100)  
  
Viet Nam 
S: North Korea (100) Igla-1/SA-16 Portable SAM (1996) 1996-1997 (100)  
       (25) Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C SSM (1997) 1998 (25)  
  
Yemen 
S: North Korea (45) Hwasong-6/Scud Mod-C SSM (1994) 2001-2002 (45)  
 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 26  
Chart 1. North Korean weapons export items 
 
The table and chart display the North Korea’s main proliferation includes conventional weapons and 
Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM). However, they do not cover the proliferation of military expertise and 
WMD. Furthermore, although Pakistan is not one of the largest importers of North Korean weapons 
according to the SIPRI data, the link between Pyongyang and Islamabad is crucial in understanding the 
North Korean proliferation. The following timeline shows the history of North Korean proliferation 
activities with its partners including Pakistan.  
 
(4) Timeline 
In addition to the weapons export data, North Korea’s proliferation network dates back to 1967 when North 
Korea started dispatching military personnel for Syria fighting the Arab-Israeli war. The timeline provides 
Pyongyang’s proliferation activities that are not displayed in the export data. Proliferation activities include 
but not limited to exports, visits and dispatch of key figures such as scientists and government officials, 
intercepts of cargos from North Korean ports, transport of weapons and ammunitions, sanctions imposed on 
key entities, and major agreements. North Korea’s proliferation activities are comprised with four categories 
marked Conventional Weapons, Expertise, Missiles, and WMD. 
  
																																								 																						
26 <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/sources-and-methods> 
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Year Partners Events Category 
1967 Syria - North Korean pilots assisted the Syrian air force during the Arab-Israeli war27. Expertise 
1970 Syria - Pyongyang dispatched 200 tank crewmen, 53 pilots, and 140 technicians to Syria.28 Expertise 
1973 Egypt & Syria - During the Arab-Israeli War, the DPRK dispatched 30 pilots to Egypt and Syria, who provided training for Syrian pilots to fight against Israel.29 Expertise 
1975 Syria - Pyongyang sent 75 Air Force instructors to Damascus. 30 Expertise 
1976 Syria - Pyongyang sent 40 MIG pilots to Damascus. 31 Expertise 
1980 Iran 
- During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), North Korea emerged as one of the 
major suppliers of weapons to Iran through Pakistan. North Korean ships 
offloaded their arms cargo in the port of Karachi, Pakistan. North Korea 
supplied to Iran around 100 Scud B (Hwasong 5) ballistic missiles.32 
Conventional 
Weapons &  
Missile 
1981 Syria 
- North Korea’s arms supplies to Syria began in the early 1980s with the export 
of 50 BM-21 Grad 122mm (BM-11 version) and 10 Type-63 107mm multiple 
rocket launchers, delivered between 1981 and 1984.33 
Conventional 
weapons 
1982 Syria 
- North Korea dispatched SOF (special operations forces) servicemen to Syria to 
provide training for guerrilla operations, some of whom were killed by the 
Israeli military. 34  In the Lebanon War, the Syrian army successfully and 
efficiently used the North Korean 122mm BM-11 systems. Reportedly, around 
25 North Korean soldiers were killed during this conflict when the Israelis 
destroyed one of the MRL systems. 35 
Conventional 
weapons & 
Expertise 
1984 Syria - Fifty North Korean military instructors were sent to Syria. 36 Expertise 
1988 Iran 
- North Korea served as a conduit for Chinese transfers of Silkworm anti-ship 
missiles to Iran to avoid Washington’s censure of Beijing. It included 80 
Chinese Silkworms and 40 North Korean Scud-Bs as part of the same 
shipment.37 
Conventional 
weapons & 
Missile 
1989 Pakistan - Pakistan bought around 12-25 liquid-fueled Nodong ballistic missiles from North Korea. 38 Missile 
1990 Syria - Thirty North Korean military instructors were sent to Syria. 39 Expertise 
1991 
Pakistan - Islamabad sought Pyongyang’s assistance in long-range missile technology to counter India’s testing of the Agni missile. 40 Missile 
Syria 
- Until 1996, North Korea sold Syria 150 Scud Mod-C surface-to-surface 
missiles (SSM), some for local assembly from kits or for local production. Also, 
North Korea sold 12, or possibly even 24, 9P117/SS-1 Scud TEL (transporter 
erector-launcher), supplied between 1991 and 1993. 41 
Missile 
																																								 																						
27 David McCarthy, “The Sword of David: The Israeli Air Force at War” (New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014), 9. (McCarthyDavid 2014) 
28 Bruce Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: Partners in Destruction and Violence”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, September 2015, 279. (BechtolBruce 2015) 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 I l - Young Kim and Lakhvinder Singh, “The North Korean Nuclear Program and External Connections”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Spring 2004, 82. 
(SinghI 2004) 
33 Yitzhak Shichor, “Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its Strategic Dimensions”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter 2007, 77. (ShichorYitzhak 
2007) 
34 Bruce Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: Partners in Destruction and Violence”, 279. (BechtolBruce 2015) 
35 Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War”, 38 North, November 25, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/11/amansourov112513/  (MansourovAlexandre 2013). 
36 Bruce Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: Partners in Destruction and Violence”, 279. (BechtolBruce 2015) 
37 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 65. (MalikMohan 2003) 
38 I l - Young Kim and Lakhvinder Singh, “The North Korean Nuclear Program and External Connections”, 82. (SinghI 2004) 
39 Bruce Bechtol, “North Korea and Syria: Partners in Destruction and Violence”, 279. (BechtolBruce 2015) 
40 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 72. (MalikMohan 2003) 
41 Yitzhak Shichor, “Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its Strategic Dimensions”, 78. (ShichorYitzhak 2007) 
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1992 
Iran, Pakistan, 
& Syria 
- DPRK Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam visited Syria 
(July 27-30), Iran (July 30-August 3), and Pakistan (August 4-7) to explore areas 
of bilateral cooperation. 42 
Missile & 
WMD 
Pakistan - Pakistan’s nuclear and missile scientist, Dr. A. Q. Khan, initiated talks for purchase and transfer of 10-12 1,500-km range Nodong missiles. 43 Missile 
1993 
Iran & 
Pakistan 
- Pakistani and Iranian missile scientists were present for the DPRK’s Nodong 
missile test on May 29-30. 44 Missile 
Pakistan 
- In December, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutoo visited Beijing and  
Pyongyang seeking long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking strategic 
partners within India.45 
Missile 
1994 
Iran & 
Pakistan 
- In April, a DPRK Foreign Ministry delegation headed by Pak Chungkuk 
traveled to Pakistan and Iran. 46 Missile 
Pakistan - In September, another delegation led by Choe Hui-chong, chairman of the State Commission of Science and Technology visited Pakistan. 47 Missile 
1995 Pakistan 
- In November, a DPRK military delegation led by Marshal Choe Kwang visited 
missile production facilities in Pakistan and finalized the agreement on the 
transfer of about 12-25 Nodong missiles with Dr. A. Q. Khan and Dr. Ashfaq 
Ahmad Khan, head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. 48 
Missile 
1996 
Pakistan - Taiwan detained a North Korean ship Chusong for misdeclaration of 15 tons of ammonium perchlorate, a key missile fuel component bound for Pakistan.49 Missile 
Syria - North Korea agreed to sell Syria 25 or even 50, Scud Mod-D SSMs, delivered between 2000 and 2004.50 Missile 
1997 
Iran 
- A “joint team” of Chinese and North Korean technicians went to Iran to assist 
in Tehran’s ballistic missile efforts. The Iranian Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles 
are variants of North Korean and Chinese missiles.51 
Missile 
Pakistan - Dr. A.Q. Khan made three secret visits to North Korea. 
52  The Pakistan 
government began paying for Nodong missiles by providing nuclear expertise.53 
Missile & 
WMD 
1998 Pakistan 
- Pakistan test fired a Nodong missile renamed Ghauri on April 6, prompting the 
US State Department to impose sanctions against Changgwang Sinyong 
Corporation (CSC) and Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) on April 
24. 54  
- One week after Pakistan’s first nuclear tests, Kim Sa-nae, wife of a senior 
DPRK diplomat, was shot dead in Islamabad. A special flight transported the 
coffin that carried her body also included a sample gas centrifuge used to enrich 
uranium necessary to produce nuclear weapons.55 
Missile 
																																								 																						
42 Ibid. It is estimated that Kim sought to enhance the missile and nuclear technology cooperation between Pyongyang and the three countries. 
43 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 72. (MalikMohan 2003) 
44 Ibid. 
45 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 72. (MalikMohan 2003) 
46 Ibid. Multiple visits of high profile figures are interpreted as Pyongyang’s effort to boost cooperation in missile and nuclear technology.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 73. 
50 Yitzhak Shichor, “Evil from the North: The DPRK-Syria Axis and its Strategic Dimensions”, 78. (ShichorYitzhak 2007) 
51 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 66. (MalikMohan 2003) 
52 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 73. (MalikMohan 2003) 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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1999 Pakistan 
- In June, India caught a North Korean ship bound for Pakistan loaded with 300 
tons of equipment and engineering drawings for a plant to manufacture the 300-
km range Hwasong 5 and the 500-plus-km range Hwasong 6, both derived from 
the Scud.56 
- On September 16, Robert Walpole, national intelligence officer for Strategic 
and Nuclear Program, testified to the US Senate that Pakistan’s Ghauri missile 
was flight tested with North Korean assistance.57 
Missile 
2000 
Iran 
- IRGC tests Shahab-3 missile equipped with a North Korean engine.58  
- US State Department sanctioned Changgwang Sinyong, a North Korean 
company, and Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), 
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), Shahid Hemat Industrial Group 
(SHIG) and SANAM Industrial Group for missile technology proliferation.59 
Missile 
Syria 
- In May, North Korea shipped its first set of Scud D systems to Syria. This was 
immediately followed up by a test launch of the Scud D during September of 
2000.60 
Missile 
2002 
Hamas &  
Hezbollah 
- IDF captured a North Korean vessel carrying weapons (rockets, mortar shells, 
anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, AK-47s, sniper rifles, and ammunition) for 
Hamas and Hezbollah. 61 
Conventional 
weapons 
Iran 
- Joong-Ang Ilbo revealed that an Iranian freighter visited the North Korean 
harbors of Nampo and Songnim multiple times in February and November 2002, 
where it loaded missiles and rocket fuel destined for Iran. 62 
Missile 
Pakistan 
- In July, US satellites spotted a US-gifted Pakistani C-130 Hercules cargo plane 
picking up missile parts from North Korea at the height of India-Pakistan 
tensions. 63 
- In October, US officials publicly confirmed that Islamabad provided gas 
centrifuges for Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program, in 
return for North Korea’s supply of Nodong missiles to Pakistan.64 
Missile & 
WMD 
Syria 
- Kim Yong Nam visited Syria to sign an agreement for scientific cooperation. 
The U.S. and the IAEA believe that this agreement means Pyongyang stepped 
up efforts to assist Assad in building a nuclear reactor, which looks like North 
Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor. 65 
WMD 
Yemen - US and Spanish forces intercepted and then released a Yemen-bound North Korean vessel also carrying Scud missiles. 66 Missile 
2003 Iran 
- North Korean nuclear specialists visited Iran in 2003 to develop nuclear 
warheads for North Korean Nodong (or Shahab) missiles. Iran was reported to 
have offered shipments of oil and natural gas to North Korea to secure this joint 
development of nuclear warheads.67 North Koreans were seen at Iranian nuclear 
Missile & 
WMD 
																																								 																						
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Iran Watch, "Iran Missile Milestones: 1985-2014" Iran Watch, April 17, 2014, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/iran-missile-milestones-
1985-2014 (Iran Watch 2014) 
59 Ibid. 
60 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria Missile Chronology”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 23, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/syria_missile.pdf?_=1316466791. (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2010) 
61 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Seizing of the Palestinian weapons ship Karine A”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 04, 2002, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2002/pages/seizing%20of%20the%20palestinian%20weapons%20ship%20karine%20a%20-.aspx (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002) 
62 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 76. (MalikMohan 2003) 
63 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 74. (MalikMohan 2003) 
64 Ibid. 
65 Mark Manyin, “North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?” Washington DC, CRS, June 29, 2010. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30613.pdf. (ManyinMark 2010) 
66 Ibid. 
67 Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang”, 72. (MalikMohan 2003) 
30	
facilities. By this time, a large number of North Korean nuclear and missile 
specialists reportedly were in Iran.68 
Pakistan 
- March 24, the United States imposed sanctions against the A. Q. Khan 
Research Laboratories (KRL) of the Pakistan government and the Changgwang 
Sinyong Corporation of the North Korean government. 69 
Missile 
2004 
Syria & 
Hezbollah 
- Assad met with North Korean officials in Damascus and requested North 
Korean assistance in helping Hezbollah to design and construct underground 
military installations.70 
Expertise 
Syria 
- Several Syrian technicians from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research 
Center (SSRC)—were killed on a train in an apparent attempt to kill Kim Jong 
Il—who was not on the train. The Syrians killed were carrying missile 
components and other materials (perhaps chemical weapons related) to the North 
Korean port of Nampo for shipment to Syria.71 
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2005 
Hezbollah 
- North Korean assisted Hezbollah construct bunkers and tunnels, the IRGC 
apparently made further use of North Korea’s skills in developing underground 
military facilities. 72 
Expertise 
Iran 
- The German news magazine, Der Spiegel, quoted “western intelligence service 
circles” as describing Iran offering North Korea economic aid if Pyongyang 
“continues to cooperative actively in developing nuclear missiles for Tehran”. 73 
- Myong Lyu-do, a leading North Korean expert on underground facilities, 
traveled to Tehran to run the program of North Korean assistance.74 
- North Korea allegedly supplies Iran with 18 missile assembly kits for 
Musudan. 75 
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2006 Hezbollah 
- A few weeks after the Israel-Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon, 18 trucks carrying 
air defense system was intercepted in Cyprus. The cargo had been loaded in 
North Korea and was on its way to the Syrian port of Latakiya. 76 
- The State Department’s Fact Sheet asserted that the IRGC “has assisted 
Hezbollah in rearming” since the 2006 war, presumably including the supply of 
new longer-range missiles77 
- The Paris Intelligence Online report of September 7, 2006, describing the role 
of North Korean instructors in the construction of Hezbollah’s underground 
military installations in southern Lebanon in the period before the 2006 war, 
asserts that IRGC General Mir Faysal Baqer Zadah supervised the construction 
of the underground facilities. 78 
- After the 2006 war, 100 Hezbollah commandos traveled to North Korea for a 
year of training in guerrilla warfare tactics under guidance of the 
Reconnaissance Bureau.79 
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2006 Iran 
- National Council of Resistance of Iran, an exile opposition group asserted that 
North Korean experts were working at the Memot Missile Industries Complex in 
Iran to develop intermediate range missile with a range of 1,900 miles and the 
Shahab 4 missile. Later in 2006, it was reported that North Korea had shipped its 
new Musudan intermediate range missile.80 
- IRGC Chief Commander publicly acknowledged for the first time that it had 
obtained missiles from North Korea during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, but 
added that it no longer needed Pyongyang’s assistance.81 
Missile 
2007 
Iran 
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in November 2007 that North 
Korea had supplied Iran with missiles with a range of 1,562 miles (probably the 
Musudan).82 
Missile 
Syria 
- Several North Korean workers allegedly killed in the Israeli airstrikes on the 
Syrian nuclear reactor.83 	Dozens of pictures from inside the facility showed 
North Korean workers in the facility. 84 
- July 27, several Iranian advisors, Syrian technicians, and North Korean 
advisors were reportedly killed when they were loading a chemical warhead 
controling VX and Sarin onto a Scud missile for a test-launch. 85 
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2008 
Hezbollah 
- A Lebanese government official in early 2008 noted that North Korea assisted 
Hezbollah to construct new underground military facilities north of the Litani 
River in Lebanon. 86 
Expertise 
Iran 
- National Council of Resistance of Iran claimed that the Iranian Defense 
Ministry has a secret facility at Khojir near Tehran, and North Korean specialists 
are at this facility to develop nuclear warheads for intermediate range ballistic 
missiles.87 
- The Sankei Shimbun report of July 12, 2008, also described two visits of high-
level Iranian officials to North Korea in February and May. The Iranian 
delegation included officials of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and National 
Security Council. 88 
- North Korea and Iran reportedly carried out joint tests of the Musudan, and 
reportedly signed an agreement for the continued North Korean supply of 
Musudan technology to Iran.89 
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Iran or Syria, 
(Hezbollah & 
Hamas) 
- North Korean cargo filled with rocket fuses bound for Bandar Abbas in Iran 
were seized by an unspecified United Nations Member State, the cargo was en 
route to Iran or Syria, where Hamas or Hezbollah could have been the end-
users.90 
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2007 “similar to Yongbyon in North Korea, but with its outer structure heavily 
disguised”. 91 
2009 
Iran 
- Iranian officials are reportedly present when North Korea launches a long-
range rocket (Unha-2) in April and detonates a nuclear device in May. 92  
- UAE detained a vessel from the DPRK to Bandar Abbas, Iran. The cargo 
included detonators, rocket launchers, munitions, and explosives including 
ammunition for rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons.93 
- The Japanese Kyodo news agency reported in December that North Korea 
failed to supply Iran with electronic components for the Musudan in 2009, 
causing Iran to postpone a test launch of the missile.94 
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Syria 
- In March, Israel intercepted 500 tons of North Korean weapons on its way 
from Iran to Syria. Weapons on board included: mortars, rockets, ammunition 
for AK-47s, hand grenades, anti-tank shells, and rocket fuses.95 North Korea has 
been one of the primary weapon suppliers to Syria for decades.96 
- In October, the ROK seized North Korean-origin chemical warfare protective 
suits destined for Syria.97 
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2010 
Hezbollah - With the Pyongyang-backed Syrian assistance, Hezbollah launched two Scud D missiles with a range of 700 kilometers. 98 Missile 
Iran 
- North Korean aircraft loaded with weapons (rockets, fuses, rocket-propelled 
grenades and missile parts) was seized in Thailand. According to Bloomberg 
News, which obtained a copy of the Thai government report, the cargo was 
destined for Mahrabad Airport in Tehran.99 
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Republic of 
Congo 
- In February, South Africa seized North Korean-origin spare tank parts destined 
for the Republic of Congo.100 
Conventional 
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2011 
Myanmar 
- In June 2011, the M/V Light, a merchant vessel bound for Myanmar suspected 
of carrying military-related cargo, returned to North Korea after refusing a U.S. 
Navy inspection request.101 
Conventional 
weapons 
Palestine 
- Israel Defense Forces captured a vessel and found anti-ship missiles and 
associated launchers, mortar shells, radar systems, AK-47s ammunition. These, 
the IDF said, were Gaza-bound and Iranian-made. 102 
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2012 Iran 
- A group of 12 officials from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), 
which is involved in Iran's ballistic missile program, reportedly attended a failed 
rocket launch in North Korea.103 
-North Korea-Iran Science Cooperation Agreement in Sept 2012 controls the 
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similar wording—including provisions for “exchange of expertise” and “joint 
use of scientific research equipment”—as the scientific agreement signed 
between North Korea and Syria in 2002.104 
- Iran and North Korea sign a science and technology cooperation agreement. 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declares that the two countries have “common 
enemies”.105 
2013 Syria 
- Syrian Observatory for Human Rights revealed that North Korean military 
officers were assisting the Assad regime suppressing Syrian rebel groups. North 
Korean soldiers are said to have been providing Assad’s troops with logistical 
support, creating operational plans for them and even supervising Syrian 
government artillery attacks against the opposition.106 
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2014 
Hamas 
- During the 2014 Gaza war, Hamas militants launched surprise attacks from 
allegedly North Korean-style tunnels that crossed under Israel's security fence 
and into Israel.107 
Expertise 
Syria 
- Photos showed ISIS militants using a North Korean variant of the Igla-1E 
MAN Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS), which means they captured 
the North Korean weapons provided to the Assad’s forces.108 
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2015 Iran 
- Seven-person North Korean Defense Ministry team was in Iran during the last 
week of April. This was the third time in 2015 that North Koreans had been to 
Iran and a nine-person delegation was due to return in June, according to NCRI 
(National Council of Resistance of Iran). 109 
Unknown 
2016 Syria - Russian media agency TASS covered that Two North Korean units called Chalma-1 and Chalma-7 are fighting for Assad regime in Syria110 Expertise 
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